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Abstract The Spanish Roma population have co-existed with the broader popula-
tion of Spain, under the same laws and regulations for more than 500 years, but they
exhibit very different fertility patterns. The aim of this paper is to determine whether
there are factors other than income or education that can explain the larger number of
children in Spanish Roma families. Our analysis reveals that the existence of a family
business, which is highly labor-demanding, appears to be associated with parental
decisions concerning the number of children. Since parental authority, in Roma
families, holds sway over children even after their own marriage, the future labor
contributions of children are particularly beneficial to the family business.
Keywords Roma Spanish population  Fertility  Bargaining power
JEL Classification C78  D13  J11
1 Introduction
Countries with high and growing per capita income have, in recent years,
experienced significant declines in fertility, to the extent that most of those countries
now have below replacement-level fertility rates (Feyrer et al. 2008). The pattern
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revealed by macroeconomic indicators tends to obscure the differences in fertility
levels across minority ethnic populations in developed countries,1 with Spain being
a good example. Spanish Roma families have more children than do families in the
majority Spanish population, despite the more than 500 years of co-existence. In
this paper, we analyze the factors that are related to these higher fertility rates.
This analysis takes us into the long debate among demographers and economists
about the explanatory factors of fertility patterns, most notably, the Demographic
Transition. According to Oppenheim (1997), the ‘‘granddaddy’’ of fertility, transition
theory, for most demographers, was formulated by Thompson (1930) and Notestein
(1953),2 who attribute fertility declines over time to changes in social life, accompanied
by industrialization and urbanization. However, for most economists, the seminal work
of Becker (1960) is the starting point. Becker’s fertility theory considers children to be
consumer durables who provide utility to their parents, and introduces the concept of a
quantity-versus-quality trade-off in fertility choice, which generates a mechanism to
explain the observed mostly-negative relationship between income and fertility. This
mechanism was linked to the theory of economic growth in Barro and Becker (1988),
which led to the publication of several papers3 focused on explaining the evolution from
pre-industrial, Malthusian economies (characterized by economic stagnation, high
mortality rates, and high birth rates) to industrial economies (characterized by positive
economic growth, low mortality rates, and low birth rates).
Both points of departure have been criticized and contradicted. A leading detractor
of those views that overemphasize economic factors as an explanation of fertility
patterns is Coale (1986), who provides evidence that the correlations among the
indicators of urbanization and industrialization, and the timing of fertility declines, are
weak and inconsistent. In 1960, this author had already stated ‘‘If depression and
recovery do not explain the fertility reversal in the 1930s and the sustained rise since,
how can we account for them? The explanation is necessarily noneconomic in part’’.4
Coale argues that fertility patterns are determined by the diffusion of norms. Becker’s
fertility theory ruled out shifts in tastes as a factor affecting fertility, although there are
certain studies establishing that the shift toward individualism and self-fulfillment
accounts for fertility decline (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006). However, other studies
look in the opposite direction: the maintenance of traditional family values, especially
those with rigid norms, may be the cause of low fertility levels (McDonald 2000;
Caldwell and Schindlmayr 2003). Recently, Ferna´ndez and Fogli (2009) find a positive
impact of culture on the fertility behavior of second-generation American women, who
interact with the same markets and institutions, but differ in their cultural heritage.
Economists continue to hold that different time-opportunity costs may explain
different fertility patterns per se; more educated and/or wealthier parents decide to
1 For a review of the minority ethnic literature see, for instance, Poston et al. (2006) and Chabe´-Ferret
and Melindi (2013).
2 Notestein (1945) is the pioneer of a common point of view about mortality decline as explanation for
fertility transition. A decline in infant mortality makes it unnecessary to have many children to ensure the
desired family size.
3 See, among others, Becker et al. (1990) and Galor and Weil (2000).
4 See pages 6–7 of ‘‘Introduction to Demographic and Economic Change in Developed countries’’.
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have fewer children, due to the greater time-opportunity cost of child-rearing (De la
Croix and Doepke 2003; Jones et al. 2008). A more reasonable and balanced
position is to assume that fertility patterns share economic and non-economic causes
(Oppenheim 1997; Guinnane 2011). We consider both of these notions to explain
why the Spanish Roma population fertility rate is higher than that of the majority
Spanish population. Both benefit from a welfare system that guarantees universal,
free access to health and education, which tends to make the explicit costs of raising
children a non-significant factor. However, Spanish Roma income and education
levels are significantly lower, which leads us to consider the lower time-opportunity
cost of childbearing as a probable factor of influence. On the other hand, traditions
and values are very important for Roma communities. Two facts are worth noting.
First, the family is the core of the Roma social organization; family members
usually live very close to each other, family ties are very strong, and family
traditions appear to matter much more than the market and institutions. Second, the
family is at the core of Roma economic activity. More than 25 % of the Roma
population in Spain is involved in a family or own business, compared to less than
8 % of the total Spanish population5 and, more precisely, most Spanish Roma
family businesses are oriented towards street or market sale.
The crux of this paper is the consideration that the over-representation of this
type of family business, linked to street or market sale, among the Spanish Roma
population may be associated with this higher fertility rate. Consider a market
vendor who offers goods, say clothing, in a public square or street. The business
does not require a high-level education, or a considerable money investment, but it
does require a significant amount of labor to set up the stall every day, to organize
the products on display in order to attract customers, and to dismantle the stall at the
end of the trading day. Since the vendor assures the economic viability of the
business by selling goods at cheaper prices than stores in shopping centers, success
relies on involving the whole family in the selling process. Our hypothesis is that
Spanish Roma parents decide to have more children to benefit their family business.
We are not referring to child labor,6 but to young adults able to work and take
decisions. Because Spanish Roma children are subject to parental authority even
after their own marriage, parents take into account the future participation of their
children, i.e. the future labor contributions of their children, which, as a
consequence, is related to the demand for children. Our paper is in the line with
the work of Broussard et al. (2015), who provide empirical evidence supporting the
importance of the family business in higher rates of fertility. These authors claim
that a head of household prefers to sell the business to an insider, i.e. a child, which,
in turn, encourages fertility. However, our hypothesis is quite different. Our
theoretical and empirical analysis confirms a positive association between the fact
that Spanish Roma families’ main activity relies on highly labor-demanding family
businesses, i.e. market or street-selling activities, and a larger number of children.
5 Source: own elaboration using the 2011 Spanish Roma Population Survey (SRPS) provided by the
Fundacio´n Secretariado Gitano (FSG) and the Spain Economically Active Population Survey (Statistical
Spanish Office: http://www.ine.es/en/inebmenu/mnu_mercalab_en.htm).
6 In many economies, children are an important economic asset with a high contribution to the family
economy (Guinnane, 2011).
Fertility patterns in the Roma population of Spain 117
123
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief descriptive
analysis of the Roma population in Spain. Section 3 sets up the model and derives
the basic theoretical findings. The empirical study is presented in Sect. 4, and
Sect. 5 outlines our conclusions.
2 The Roma population in Spain
The Spanish Roma first arrived in Spain in the fifteenth century, and they have
shown strong group cohesion and maintained their distinctive characteristics over
time.7 The estimated number of Roma living in Spain is around 700,000 (Council of
Europe,8 2007), a figure similar to that of Russia. Only Turkey and Romania (with
1.9 million and 1.85 million, respectively) have larger Roma populations. Following
the categorization proposed by Alesina and Giulano (2013), the Spanish Roma
family could be categorized as communitarian, in that children are subject to
parental authority, even after their own marriage, and are treated equally. Focusing
on the majority ethnic group in the country, these authors classify the Spanish
population as egalitarian nuclear families, characterized by independent living
arrangements and egalitarian inheritance rules. The average Spanish Roma
household has 4.7 individuals, compared to the general average of 2.8 individuals
in Spanish households.9
There are three characteristics of the Spanish Roma population that should be
emphasized. First, their fertility patterns differ from the Spanish population in that,
on average, they have more children. Second, the Spanish Roma population is a
deprived ethnic minority, with low education and income levels. Third, the main
economic activity of a high percentage of the Spanish Roma is running a family or
own business, mostly as street or market vendors.
2.1 Database
Spanish laws covering the protection of data10 prohibit the incorporation of ethnic
variables in the census, making the study of ethnic groups in Spain problematic. The
intercultural, social non-profit organization Fundacio´n Secretariado Gitano11 (FSG)
has allowed us access to the microdata of a transnational survey, carried out jointly
7 See Action Plan for the development of the Roma Population, Spanish Ministry of Health, Social
Policy, and Equality. http://www.msssi.gob.es/politicaSocial/inclusionSocial/poblacionGitana/docs/
INGLES_ACCESIBLE.pdf.
8 See http://web.archive.org/web/20090221234346/http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/documentation/
strategies/statistiques_en.asp.
9 See Diagno´stico social de la comunidad gitana en Espan˜a (2011), page 226 Spanish Ministry of Health,
Social Policy and Equality. http://www.msssi.gob.es/politicaSocial/inclusionSocial/poblacionGitana/docs/
diagnosticosocial_autores.pdf.
10 Ley Orga´nica 15/1999, de 13 de diciembre de Proteccio´n de Datos de Cara´cter Personal. See Appendix
III of the report ‘‘Ethnic statistics and data protection in the Council of Europe countries’’ elaborated by
Simon (2007).
11 For more details, see http://www.gitanos.org/quienes_somos/mision_estrategia.html.en.
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by the Soros Foundation and the Open Society Institute, in 2011.12 This database
considers the labor situation of the Spanish Roma population and comprises, apart
from income and education, other demographic, sociological, and economic
characteristics, making it possible to advance our knowledge of other aspects of this
minority ethnic group, e.g. its fertility patterns. The Spanish Roma Population
Survey (SRPS) survey is based on the same indicators and methodology as Spain’s
Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS),13 which includes the Spanish
Roma population residing in the national territory, aged 16 and over (16 being the
minimum legal age of employment in Spain). Our sample size is 1,497 interviews of
Spanish Roma residents, which allows us to infer results with a 2.53 % margin of
error. The field work carried out a single interview per household, incorporating
questions about gender, age, and employment variables for all members of the
household. The final exploitation of the data applies the appropriate weighting
factors to balance the interviewee sample.14
2.2 Some stylized facts
The data reveals that Spanish Roma fertility patterns differ from those of the majority
Spanish population. Table 1 shows the average number of children per individual,
comparing the Spanish Roma population and the population as a whole. We observe a
significant gap between the Spanish Roma fertility patterns and those of the Spanish
population at large. It is necessary to point out that, since the last fertility survey of the
general Spanish population occurred in 1999, a perfect comparison is not possible. An
alternative approach, using 2011 as the reference year, is possible using data included
in the study Spanish and migrant Roma population in Spain: employment and social
inclusion—2011—a comparative study, which revealed that the proportion of
individuals aged 14 and under was 26.3 % of the Roma population, compared to
14.75 % of the general Spanish population. The care of Spanish Roma children is the
responsibility of the whole household unit, and children may be in the care of their
mother and/or their father and/or other adults who are not their parents but are
members of the family (grandparents, uncles, aunts…).15
A common stereotype of the Spanish Roma population is that this minority ethnic
group does not recognize the value of work. Laparra (2007) provides evidence
against this assertion, finding that, in fact, the Spanish Roma enter the labor market
at an earlier age and have higher activity rates than the general Spanish population,
particularly in family economic activities. Table 2 presents the percentage of the
population by occupation, for both groups. The greatest difference between the
Spanish Roma and the average Spanish population is the lower percentage of
12 See Spanish and Migrant Roma Population in Spain: Employment And Social Inclusion—2011—A
Comparative study, page 203, http://www.gitanos.org/upload/14/10/Situatia_romilor_-_english.pdf.
13 http://www.ine.es/en/inebmenu/mnu_mercalab_en.htm.
14 For more details about methodology see Spanish and Migrant Roma Population In Spain: Employment
And Social Inclusion—2011—A Comparative study, pages 205, 212 and 213. http://www.gitanos.org/
upload/14/10/Situatia_romilor_-_english.pdf.
15 Factsheets on Roma Population. Council of Europe. http://romafacts.uni-graz.at/.
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Spanish Roma employees, which is compensated for by the higher percentage in the
category of family or own business. Interestingly, 46.1 %16 of the working Roma
population is employed in one particular type of commercial activity, i.e. itinerant
trade or street markets, and 94 % of the latter run a family or own business, rather
than being employees.
The SRPS also provides information on income. The Survey of Income and
Labor Conditions (SILC) indicates a total disposable monthly household income of
close to €2,400 for the general Spanish population, whereas SRPS shows that this
average for the Roma population is around €522. The Spanish Roma population is at
the bottom of the income distribution, and the picture is more dramatic still in terms
of education (see Fig. 1).
There remains a very high drop-out rate before the end of compulsory secondary
education among the Spanish Roma population. Around 50 % of the Spanish Roma
population did not complete primary school, compared to 10 % for the average
Spanish population. At the upper levels of education, almost 24 % of the general
population attained a level higher than secondary school, while this number is less
than 3 % for the Spanish Roma population. That it is to say, the Spanish Roma are
also at the bottom of the education distribution.
3 A theoretical framework
In this section, we develop a model to show the interrelation between the parents’
decisions about labor contributions to the family business, the desired number of
children, and the children’s future decisions about labor contributions to the family
business. Basically, the model builds on assumptions that the greater the future
productivity of children, the more valuable their future contributions to the family
business and, hence, the greater the incentives of parents to have more children.
This analytical framework is original in combining a bargaining model with a
unitary model. Parents, and children in their adulthood, bargain their contribution to
the family business. This bargaining mechanism between parents and adult children
is unusual, and prior literature often implicitly assumes that within multi-member
Table 1 Average number of
children
Source: Own elaboration from
SRPS and 1999 Fertility Survey
(Statistical Spanish Office)
a For Spanish Roma population
the range is 16–19
Age range Spanish Roma population Spanish population
15–19a 0.14 0.02
20–24 0.55 0.06
25–29 1.37 0.42
30–34 1.79 1.23
35–39 2.14 1.74
40–44 2.27 2.00
45–49 2.39 2.36
Total 1.41 1.07
16 Only 649 respondents report their main occupation.
120 R. Aisa et al.
123
households, the only bargaining is between the husband and wife, with other
members being assumed to be passive or unimportant in the bargaining process
(Doss 2013). Note that this bargaining process is feasible in our context because of
the idiosyncratic characteristics of the Spanish Roma family, i.e. the children are
subject to parental authority even after their own marriage. Parents anticipate these
future labor contributions of their children in such a way that they are taken into
account in deciding, jointly, the number of children desired. The Spanish Roma
parents’ behavior is close to that of agricultural families, as both consider children
to be investment goods, useful in the market-selling business, and on the farm.
However, in agricultural household models, production decisions are independent of
preference decisions (LaFave and Thomas 2014) and parents and adult children do
not bargain to decide the allocation of resources within the household. Udry (1996)
considers a Nash-bargaining model in which husband and wives allocate labor to
their own and each other’s plots, but the relationship between land production and
family size is not introduced.
Table 2 Percentage of population by occupation, 2011
Spanish Roma population Spanish population
Employee 16.40 38.81
Family or own business 25.61 7.77
Looking for a job 27.20 14.19
Student 4.06 6.75
Retired 5.56 14.49
Another pension 4.01 1.09
Disability 2.51 1.58
Housewife 14.64 15.31
No. observations survey 1497 139,689
Source: Own elaboration from SRPS and EAPS
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Fig. 1 Percentage of population in all levels of education, 2011. Source: Own elaboration from SRPS
and EAPS
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In this line, we build a theoretical family model where the optimum number of
children is obtained as the solution of a two-stage game, played among parents and
adult children. In the first stage, father (mother) unilaterally decides the size of the
family, and in the second stage, the level of family business is the result of a
bargaining process among parents and their young adult children. Although the
family size is unilaterally decided, the dynamic nature of the game implies that the
bargaining solution is linked to the optimum number of children, by means of the
level of the family business run by the family members.
Let us consider a representative family that runs a business. Parent’s (father or
mother) preferences are given by the following utility function:17
UPðQ;CP; tPÞ ¼ ln Qð Þ þ CP  BðtPÞ; ð1Þ
where Q is the level of a family public good, i.e. the family business, Cp is the
parent private good consumption level, and tp is the time devoted by the parent to
the family business. This time implies a cost in utility terms, B(.) that takes the
following functional form:
BðtPÞ ¼ t2P :
This utility cost encompasses individual tastes for work outside the home, and the
monetary opportunity costs of working for the family rather than for others. Note
that the family business is not a perfect substitute for market private goods. The
utility function of a representative adult child is given by:
UYðQ;CY ; tYÞ ¼ ln Qð Þ þ CY  t2Y ; ð2Þ
with tY being the time devoted by each adult child to the production of the family
business. The interrelationship between parents and adult children is channeled
primarily through the family business. The only utility that parents obtain from
having children comes from the children’s contribution to the family business. The
functional forms considered guarantee strictly quasi-concave and increasing utility
functions of the parent and each adult child.
We assume that the family business takes a Cobb-Douglas form:
Q ¼ ðtPÞ1aðntYÞa; 0\a\1; ð3Þ
with n being the number of adult children in the household.
Focusing now on the budget restrictions of each family member, we denote the
parent income as Mp,
18 devoted to the parent’s own consumption, and also to an
explicit monetary transfer to each adult children, T. Transfers within families are
common (Cox and Fafchamps 2008). To maintain the tractability of the problem, we
assume that the adult children do not work outside the family, in such a way that the
transfer from the parent is devoted to private good consumption. A shortcoming of
this framework is that the time opportunity costs of raising children are not
17 This functional form is based on Suen et al. (2003).
18 For the sake of simplicity, we consider parent income as exogenous. Results are not affected if we
assume that the parent income is a function of the number of children Mp (n) such that, Mp
0
[ 0, Mp
00
\ 0.
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considered. This is because, while this trade-off between time cost of children and
their number is the norm in the economic literature, we wish to draw attention to the
connection between the costs of raising children and the contribution to the family
business through a bargaining process.
We solve a two-stage sequential game under perfect information. In the first
stage, the parent individually decides the number of children, n, and in the second
stage, the effort devoted to the family business by each family member is the result
of a bilateral bargaining process among the parent and the adult children. Applying
backward induction, we begin to solve the second stage of the game. Following
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Chen and Woolley (2001), the non-cooperative
setting (Cournot–Nash) in which the parent and each young adult child individually
decide their contribution to the business production is used as a threat point for the
cooperative Nash-bargaining problem. Therefore, the parent problem is given by:
Max
tP
UPðtP; tY ; nÞ ¼ ð1 aÞ lnðtPÞ þ a lnðntYÞ þ CP  t2P;
subject to CP ¼ MP  nT ;
ð4Þ
and the problem of a representative young adult is given by:
Max
tY
UYðtP; tY ; nÞ ¼ ð1 aÞ lnðtPÞ þ a lnðntYÞ þ CY  t2Y ;
subject to CY ¼ T:
ð5Þ
Solving these problems, we obtain that the contribution level of the parent to the
family good in the non-cooperative setting amounts to tP ¼ 1a2
 1
2, whereas the
effort devoted by each young adult child to the family good amounts to tY ¼ a2
 1
2.
Notice that, at the threat point, the optimum contribution of each adult child to the
family business does not depend on the number of siblings. Introducing these levels
into the utility functions, we obtain the optimum utility levels under a non-
cooperative setting:
UP ¼
ð1 aÞ ln 1a
2
 þ a ln a
2
 
2
þ a lnðnÞ þMP  nT  1 a
2
; ð6Þ
UY ¼
ð1 aÞ ln 1a
2
 þ a ln a
2
 
2
þ a lnðnÞ þ T  a
2
: ð7Þ
In a cooperative equilibrium, the contributions to the family good are Pareto-
efficient. Therefore, the utility possibilities frontier is characterized by the following
conditioned optimization problem:
Max
tP;tY
UPðtP; tY ; nÞ ¼ ð1 aÞ ln tPð Þ þ a lnðntYÞ þMP  nT  t2P;
s:t:UYðtP; tY ; nÞ ¼ ð1 aÞ ln tPð Þ þ a lnðntYÞ þ T  t2Y :
ð8Þ
obtaining that the Pareto-efficient level of contribution to the family business by the
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parent is ~tP ¼ ð1þnÞð1aÞ2
h i1
2
whereas that of each adult child is ~tY ¼ ð1þnÞa2n
h i1
2
giving
rise to the family business: ~Qðn; aÞ ¼ ð1aÞ
1aaa½ 12ð1þnÞ12na
2
1
2
:
Observe that the difference between the non-cooperative and cooperative
solutions is the effect of the number of siblings in the contributions of parent and
children to the family business, in the sense that an increase in the number of adult
children increases the contribution of the parent to the family good in the
cooperative solution.
Therefore, the utility possibilities frontier obtained is:
UUPFP ða; n;UYÞ ¼
ð1þ nÞ
2
ð1 aÞ lnð1 aÞ þ a lnðaÞ þ ln 1þ n
2
 
þ a lnðnÞ  1
 
þMP  nUY :
ð9Þ
Moreover, the slope of the utility possibility curve is
dUUPFP
dUY
¼ n.
As we have previously mentioned, the allocation of welfare among the family
members is the result of the Nash bargaining solution corresponding to the
following maximization problem:19
Max
UY
N ¼ ðUUPFP  UPÞðUY  UYÞn; ð10Þ
where UP, UY , denote the parent and adult child levels of utility obtained at the
threat point, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that parents treat all children
equally and hence, no differential bargaining powers among siblings emerge.
From the first order condition of this problem:
UY þ UY þ UUPFP  UP ¼ 0; ð11Þ
we are able to obtain the optimum levels of utility in the Nash bargaining setting:
~UPða; TÞ ¼ ð1 aÞ lnð1 aÞ þ a ln aþ lnð1þ nÞ  ln 2þ a lnðnÞ  1
2
þMP  nT
 ð1 2aÞn
2ð1þ nÞ ;
ð12Þ
~UYða; TÞ ¼ ð1 aÞ lnð1 aÞ þ a ln aþ lnð1þ nÞ  ln 2þ a lnðnÞ  1
2
þ T
þ ð1 2aÞ
2ð1þ nÞ : ð13Þ
19 Considering differential bargaining power between parents and children brings the same result for
many bargaining power values, but makes it impossible to determine clear relationships between
variables without using calibrations.
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Taking into account the optimum level of parent utility in the Nash bargaining, in
the first stage of the game, the optimal number of children, n*, verifies that:
o ~UP
on
¼ ð1þ nÞ ð1þ aÞnþ a½   2nð1þ nÞ
2
T  ð1 2aÞn
2nð1þ nÞ2 ¼ 0: ð14Þ
Therefore, from (14), an implicit function that relates n, a, and T emerges. Using
the implicit function theorem, it is possible to derive the sign of on

oT , and
on
oa . We
observe a negative relationship between the optimum number of children and the
transfer to the children, on

oT \0, and a positive relationship between the optimum
number of children and the value of the productivity of young adult children in the
family good, on

oa [ 0. Note that the cost of raising children has two components: an
exogenous component, which is the transfer from the parent to each young adult
child T, and an endogenous component through the participation of adult children in
the family business. An increase in T means an increase of the (exogenous) costs of
raising children, while a higher value of the productivity of young adult children
means a reduction of the (endogenous) costs of raising children. In other words, the
presence of a family business within the household unit is associated with the costs
of raising children, and hence the number of children.20 This model is a simple
illustration of the possible effect of the presence of a family business on fertility
patterns, in isolation from other important factors in the decision about the number
of children, such as income and/or education. The empirical section shows the
overall picture by considering all potential factors that may be associated with the
number of children.
4 Empirical evidence
The main result of this section is that being involved in a family business is
positively associated with the demand for children in the Spanish Roma population,
confirming our primary hypothesis. Cultural differences of the Roma population,
measured as integration in Spanish society, also influences the fertility pattern, and
the time opportunity costs (using income and education variables as proxies) have
the expected effect. These results confirm to us that the more reasonable and
balanced position is to assume that fertility patterns share economic and non-
economic causes.
To discover whether individuals owning a family business have more children,
Broussard et al. (2015) uses data from the US Census on self-employed married
men. Our data allow us to broaden the concept of a family business to include those
individuals who provide assistance in a family business (both categories imply
involvement in a family business, managing or assisting). In parallel, our data
provide us with information about the gender of the respondent. As the Council of
20 As Broussard et al. (2015) note, one way in which risks to a family could be offset would be through
procreation, with farming households as an example. Farmers view children as assets, who can continue
to farm and produce agricultural output as the farmer ages.
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Table 3 Empirical estimations
OLS model Poisson model Second step
(Poisson)
Number of
children
Number of
children
Number of
children
Economic and labour characteristics
Family or own business female -0.1629 -0.1026 -0.2293*
Family or own business male 0.3939*** 0.2065*** 0.1056
Female inactive (reference)
Female unemployed -0.1485 -0.0699 -0.0737
Female employed -0.4846*** -0.3218*** -0.3256***
Male inactive (reference)
Male unemployed 0.2894*** 0.1580*** 0.1509**
Male employed 0.2596** 0.1252* 0.1113
Income per adult in household -0.0060*** -0.0030*** -0.0029***
Income per adult in household square 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000
Socio-demographic variables
Age (reference equal or greater than 50)
16–19 -3.7161*** -3.4943*** -3.4890***
20–24 -3.1887*** -2.0104*** -1.9906***
25–29 -2.3715*** -1.0785*** -1.0558***
30–34 -1.9641*** -0.8318*** -0.8060***
35–39 -1.5695*** -0.6242*** -0.5792***
40–44 -1.3451*** -0.5159*** -0.4889***
45–49 -1.3043*** -0.5015*** -0.4690***
Female education (reference[ high school)
Female no education 0.3072 0.1888 0.1595
Female incomplete primary education 0.4416* 0.2689** 0.2530**
Female complete primary education 0.1110 0.0755 0.0515
Female incomplete secondary education 0.4081 0.2370 0.2212
Female complete secondary education 0.0817 0.0545 0.0259
Male education (reference[ high school)
Male no education -0.0193 -0.0009 -0.0295
Male incomplete primary education -0.0301 0.0058 -0.0191
Male complete primary education 0.1319 0.1125 0.0941
Male incomplete secondary education 0.2162 0.1490 0.1241
Male complete secondary education 0.0438 0.0383 0.0349
Urban -0.0772 -0.0496 -0.0616
Cultural characteristics
Friends only from my ethnic group 0.2147 0.0853 0.0958
Friends predominantly from my ethnic group 0.0828 0.0472 0.0530
Any religion 0.0042 0.0021 0.0259
Other religion apart from orthodox, catholic,
protestant or evangelist
-0.2172 -0.1689 -0.1578
126 R. Aisa et al.
123
Europe has pointed out, Spanish Roma men and women have different roles within
the household, as well as in relations with outsiders. At home, women are
responsible for meals and house-work, while men are usually in charge of making
things, such as baskets or copperware that are sold to customers. Outside of the
home, women tend to engage in economic activities that bring them in contact with
the general public, while men engage in more specialized trade. Thus, to detect
possible differential effects of gender on the demand for more children across
respondents involved in a family business, we examine two dummy variables:
females who run or assist in the family or own business, and males who run or assist
in the family or own business. We assign value 1 to those who run or assist in their
own or the family business, and 0 to all others.
In addition to regressing the number of children of the respondent on these two
dummies, we add certain control variables, grouped in four categories: economic
and labor, socio-demographic, cultural, and perceived discrimination. Among the
economic and labor variables, we include labor market categories not linked to a
family business, such as being unemployed or an employee, with being inactive in
the labor market as the reference category. Labor market categories are mutually
exclusive, i.e. those who claim to run or assist in their own or the family business do
not declare themselves as unemployed, or employees, or inactive. We also consider
gender asymmetries with respect to the variables reflecting these labor situations.
Given the key role of income in the demand for children, especially in poorer
communities, we add as an independent variable the income per adult in the
household unit, and this variable squared, to capture a non-monotonic effect.
Table 3 continued
OLS model Poisson model Second step
(Poisson)
Number of
children
Number of
children
Number of
children
Discrimination
No personal discrimination -0.0898 -0.0446 -0.0498
Less discrimination to Roma pop. -0.1044 -0.0820* -0.0776*
Family or own business female residual 0.0489
Family or own business male residual 0.0416
_cons 4.3345*** 1.6671*** 1.6906***
No. obs. 1340 1340 1340
R2 0.45 0.24
Pearson goodness of fit 1266.807
Prob[ chi2 (1307) 0.783
RESET test
Prob[F(3, 1304) 32.46
0.000
Dependent variable, number of children
* Indicates significance at 10 % level, ** indicates significance at 5 % level, *** indicates significance at
1 % level
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Among the socio-demographic variables, we consider different age ranges of the
respondent, a variable to capture those families who live in urban areas, and the
education of the respondent divided in six education groups, with the reference
category being those with education beyond high school. Among cultural variables,
we consider two that reflect the degree of inter-relation with other cultures—
whether the respondent’s friends are solely from the same ethnic group, and whether
the friends are predominantly from the same ethnic group. We include two religion
variables—whether the respondent is religious, and whether he/she belongs to a
minority religion. To capture integration in Spanish society, we include a dummy
with value 1 for those who had not felt personally discriminated against in the past
year, and another dummy with value 1 for those who feel that the Roma community
is less discriminated against than 10 years ago. (The descriptive statistics are
provided in ‘‘Appendix 1’’).
The number of children is examined using a count model, because count data are
often incorrectly analyzed with OLS models. Table 3 presents the results of OLS
and Poisson models using robust standard errors. The RESET test shows a
specification error in the OLS model, while the Poisson model cannot reject the null
hypothesis of goodness of fit. Up to this point, we have focused on the notion that
being involved in a family business is associated with the number of children in
Spanish Roma families, but it is also possible that those Roma Spanish families with
more children see the benefits of establishing a family business. The last column of
Table 3 shows the second step of a two-step estimation in order to test exogeneity of
the variables. First, we have estimated the variables family or own business female
and family or own business male to generate the Pearson residuals. As instrumental
variables, we use two dummies to indicate whether the parents or parents-in-law of
the respondent are involved in a family business, or not. We assume that these
variables are not related to the decision about the number of children, a decision
taken by the parents, but that they are correlated with the endogenous regressors,
allowing us to consider these instruments as valid. Second, we have estimated the
parameters of the Poisson model, including the first-step residual. ‘‘Appendix 2’’
presents the estimations of these first stage models. The coefficients of the residuals
are not statistically significant, which leads to the non-rejection of the null
hypothesis of exogeneity of the variables. Table 3 presents the estimations
corresponding to the OLS model, the Poisson model, and the Poisson model with
instrumental variables. The non-rejection of the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the
variables leads us to consider the Poisson model as the more appropriate approach.
In Table 3, after controlling for a range of economic, socio-demographic,
cultural, and discrimination variables, the estimated coefficient of the variable
family or own business male is positive and statistically significant, supporting our
hypothesis that being involved in a family business is positively associated with the
demand for children in the Spanish Roma population. Interestingly, for females, the
estimated coefficient is not statistically significant, suggesting that the role played
by the male in the decision to have children is important, while that of the female is
not, confirming the hypothesis of gender differences.
Table 3 also shows that female employees have fewer children than those
females who are inactive, and male employees have no statistically significant
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difference from those males who are inactive. This is an indication that the
opportunity cost of having children is greater among female employees. Again,
gender biases are detected: being male and unemployed increases the number of
children, with respect to the reference category, while being female and unemployed
has no statistically significant effect. Income has a negative and significant effect on
the number of children and the effect is monotonic. Age presents the expected sign,
and is positively associated with the number of children. The effect of education is
only statistically significant for females with incomplete primary school, who have
more children than highly-skilled women, and this too is likely due to different
opportunity costs. The cultural variables do not present statistically significant
coefficients, although those who think that the Roma community is currently less
discriminated against than 10 years ago have fewer children, which could point to a
greater degree of integration in Spanish society.
5 Conclusions
The study of the ethnic group of Spanish Roma allows us to test the importance of
economic and cultural factors in explaining fertility patterns and, in particular, why
individuals in this group have more children than those in the majority Spanish
population. The Spanish Roma represent less than 2 % of the total Spanish
population, and the fact that families in this ethnic minority have more children, on
average, than the majority of Spanish families is not a concern for the financial
sustainability of the Spanish welfare system. However, the members of this ethnic
minority often show low levels of education and income which, in addition to a
larger family size, could imply a poverty trap. The Spanish Roma are a deprived
ethnic minority and, hence, income or educational levels may be sufficient to
explain the differential fertility patterns detected.
We propose that the existence of a family business that is highly labor-
demanding, i.e. market-selling activity, is related to parental decisions about the
number of children. Since parental authority in Roma families holds sway over
children, even after their own marriage, the future labor contributions of children
are particularly helpful in the family business, which boosts fertility. This notion is
supported by empirical analysis, although it also shows gender asymmetries. When
we control for the usual opportunity costs of raising children, i.e. income, education,
and other non-economic factors (such as perceived discrimination and religion, we
find that those fathers who are involved in a family or own business have a greater
number of children, whereas mothers involved in a family or own business do not
exhibit the same characteristic.
Acknowledgments Fundacio´n Secretariado Gitano and financial support from Spanish Ministry of
Economics (ECO2012-34828 project) are acknowledged.
Conflict of interest No potential conflicts of interest.
Informed consent Research involving human participants with informed consent.
Fertility patterns in the Roma population of Spain 129
123
Appendix 1
See Table 4.
Table 4 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Number of children 1497 1.7809 1.781 0 13
Economic and labour characteristics
Family or own business female 1497 0.1556 0.3626 0 1
Family or own business male 1497 0.2525 0.4346 0 1
Family or own business parent 1497 0.0962 0.2950 0 1
Family or own business parent spouse 1497 0.0247 0.1553 0 1
Female unemployed 1497 0.1550 0.3620 0 1
Female employed 1497 0.0955 0.2940 0 1
Male unemployed 1497 0.2685 0.4433 0 1
Male employed 1497 0.1069 0.3091 0 1
Income per adult in household 1466 158.9287 105.0713 3.13 700
Income per adult in household square 1466 36,290.8000 59,687.2300 9.77 490,000
Socio-demographic variables
Age 16–19 1497 0.1202 0.3254 0 1
Age 20–24 1497 0.1463 0.3535 0 1
Age 25–29 1497 0.1503 0.3575 0 1
Age 30–34 1497 0.1323 0.3389 0 1
Age 35–39 1497 0.0955 0.2940 0 1
Age 40–44 1497 0.0855 0.2797 0 1
Age 45–49 1497 0.0882 0.2836 0 1
Female no education 1497 0.0982 0.2977 0 1
Female incomplete primary education 1497 0.2024 0.4019 0 1
Female complete primary education 1497 0.1075 0.3099 0 1
Female incomplete secondary education 1497 0.0528 0.2237 0 1
Female complete secondary education 1497 0.0434 0.2039 0 1
Male no education 1497 0.0815 0.2737 0 1
Male incomplete primary education 1497 0.2111 0.4082 0 1
Male complete primary education 1497 0.0808 0.2727 0 1
Male incomplete secondary education 1497 0.0668 0.2498 0 1
Male complete secondary education 1497 0.0307 0.1726 0 1
Urban 1497 0.3066 0.4612 0 1
Cultural characteristics
Friends only from my ethnic group 1495 0.0783 0.2687 0 1
Friends predominantly from my ethnic group 1495 0.3151 0.4647 0 1
Any religion 1497 0.8544 0.3528 0 1
Other religion a part from orthodox, catholic,
protestant or evangelist
1497 0.0060 0.0773 0 1
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Appendix 2
See Table 5.
Table 4 continued
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Discrimination
No personal discrimination 1427 0.6959 0.4602 0 1
Less discrimination to Roma pop. 1437 0.5741 0.4946 0 1
Source: SRPS
Table 5 Empirical estimations
Family or own business
female
Family or own
business male
Instrumental variables
Family or own business parent 0.6527** 0.3524
Family or own business parent spouse 0.5727 0.6854*
Economic and labour characteristics
Income per adult in household 0.0009 0.0046**
Income per adult in household square 0.0000 0.0000**
Socio-demographic variables
Age (reference equal or greater than 50)
16–19 -0.6177 0.3002
20–24 0.0844 0.6264**
25–29 0.1687 0.8954***
30–34 0.5840* 0.9121***
35–39 1.0158*** 1.2335***
40–44 0.7088** 0.7512**
45–49 1.0439*** 0.7961***
Female education (reference[ high school)
Female no education -0.3684 -1.2827***
Female incomplete primary education -0.0148 -0.9420**
Female complete primary education -0.3504 -0.9131**
Female incomplete secondary education -0.0297 -0.7835
Female complete secondary education -0.5838 -0.4814
Male education (reference[ high school)
Male no education -1.1157** -0.6463
Male incomplete primary education -1.0239** -0.4017
Male complete primary education -0.8939* -0.2159
Male incomplete secondary education -0.8476 -0.4823
Male complete secondary education -0.2937 0.3384
Urban -0.6142*** -0.2162
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